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No More Ping-Pong: The Need for Article III Status in 
Bankruptcy After Stern v. Marshall 
Latoya C. Brown* 
“Unfortunately, Stern v. Marshall has become the mantra of every liti-
gant who, for strategic or tactical reasons, would rather litigate some-
where other than the bankruptcy court.”
1
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Quite aptly, the United States Supreme Court borrowed the 
words of Charles Dickens to describe the life of the case that ultimate-
ly resulted in Stern v. Marshall:2 “This suit has, in the curse of time, 
become so complicated, that . . . no two . . . lawyers can talk about it 
for five minutes, without coming to a total disagreement as to all the 
premises.’”3  Ironically, even after the Court’s decision, the “curse”4 has 
continued and many, especially those of the bankruptcy bar, are in 
disagreement as to the ultimate outcome and unforeseen consequenc-
es of Stern.5   
The “big fuss”6 arose out of the Court’s holding that bankruptcy 
courts do not have constitutional authority to enter final judgment on 
                                                                                                                           
 * J.D., 2013.  I thank Professor Jerry Markham for serving as my faculty advisor on this 
paper and for his invaluable insight. 
 1 In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., 457 B.R. 299, 308 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 2 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011) (5-4 decision). 
 3 Id. at 2600 (quoting 1 CHARLES DICKENS, Bleak House, in THE WORKS OF CHARLES 
DICKENS 4, 4-5 (illustrated ed. 1891)). 
 4 Id. 
 5 See infra note 18 and accompanying text.  
 6 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620 (“If our decision today does not change all that much, then why 
the fuss?”).  As bankruptcy courts begin to deal with the many issues left unresolved by Stern, 
and as litigants, justifiably or unjustifiably, continue to challenge the authority of bankruptcy 
courts citing Stern, Justice Roberts’s assertion that Stern ‘does not change much’ has become 
quite inexplicable.  As Professor Kuney neatly puts it, “Justice Breyer may not have been able to 
command a majority of the court and thus be ‘constitutionally correct,’ but he has definitely 
been right about one thing: Justice Roberts’s statement that as a ‘practical matter’ the Stern v. 
Marshall decision ‘does not change all that much’ was either tongue-in-cheek or decidedly incor-
rect.”  George W. Kuney, Stern v. Marshall:  A Likely Return to the Bankruptcy Act’s Sum-
mary/Plenary Distinction in Article III Terms, 21 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1, art. 1, 9 (2012) (citing 
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620). 
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a state law counterclaim “that is not resolved in the process of ruling 
on a creditor’s proof of claim.”7  The Court stated that common law 
claims, as well as suits in equity and admiralty, fall within the province 
of Article III courts, and Congress cannot “chip away at the authority 
of the judicial branch”8 by enacting statutes delegating such power to 
non-Article III judges.9  The Constitution grants judicial power to 
courts whose judges enjoy tenure during good behavior and salary 
protections.10   
Article III provisions are safeguards against intrusion by other 
branches of government and they ensure that judicial decisions are 
being made with “[c]lear heads . . . and honest hearts.”11  A different 
outcome would have been likely if the case involved a ‘public right’ 
because the Court has recognized that Congress has the authority to 
adjudicate in suits involving that exception.12  The public rights excep-
tion applies in cases where a “right is integrally related to particular 
federal government action.”13  
Other than the obvious limiting effect that Stern will have on 
bankruptcy courts with regards to adjudicating common law claims, 
the decision raises other concerns; specifically, the decision suggests 
that the Court may entertain other constitutional challenges to Con-
gress’s grant of authority to bankruptcy judges.14  Such scrutiny of 
bankruptcy courts is not novel, however, given that Article III judges 
started questioning the legitimacy of bankruptcy judges as early as the 
1970s.15  Some scholars have theorized that the “denial of Article III 
power and prestige to the bankruptcy court”16 is the result of an arbi-
trary hierarchy of power in the judicial system of the United States 
and a stigma that attached to bankruptcy early on in the practice.17     
                                                                                                                           
 7 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620. 
 8 Id.  
 9 See id. at 2594.  
 10 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
 11 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609 (quoting 1 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 363 (James DeWitt An-
drews ed., 1896)). 
 12 See Den (ex dem. Murray) v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856). 
 13 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2613. 
 14 See In re Safety Harbor Resort & Spa, 456 B.R. 703, 709 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011) (“But 
the Supreme Court, foreshadowing its ultimate holding, then observes: ‘We agree with Pierce 
that designating all counterclaims as ‘core’ proceedings raises serious constitutional concerns.’”) 
(quoting Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2605).  
 15 See Linda Coco, Stigma, Prestige and the Cultural Context of Debt:  A Critical Analysis of 
the Bankruptcy Judge’s Non-Article III Status, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 181, 194-95 (2011); see also 
Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 1979 ANN. SURV. 
BANKR. L. 2 (1979) (providing an in depth look at the making of the fifth bankruptcy law of the 
United States and the reaction of certain members of the Judiciary). 
 16 Coco, supra note 15, at 184-88.  
 17 Id. at 186-91. 
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Stern has created a buzz in the media, academic settings and at 
bar,18 leading Chief Justice Roberts to ask, “Why all the fuss?”19  There 
are a number of responses to the Chief Justice’s question.  Among the 
criticisms and concerns, some believe Stern will result in: (1) a less ef-
ficient process in bankruptcy courts and increase in case overload in 
federal district courts;20 (2) forum shopping; 21(3) a prolongation of the 
tension between Article III judges and bankruptcy judges;22 (4) separa-
tion of powers issues;23 and (5) misunderstanding as to the role consent 
plays in bankruptcy proceedings.24  
This article takes a closer look at Stern in Part I, and highlights 
the key rationale for the Court’s holding.  Part I also briefly examines 
applicable legislative history, as well as prior cases that led the majori-
ty to take the position it did in Stern.  In Part II, the article addresses 
the concerns that are being voiced by judges and scholars regarding 
Stern’s outcome.  This article explores these criticisms and ultimately 
concludes that these issues stem from the current structure of the 
American bifurcated, hybrid bankruptcy system,25 and are not unique 
by-products of the Stern decision.   
                                                                                                                           
 18 See, e.g., In re CD Liquidation Co., 462 B.R. 124, 136 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (“During the 
pendency of the briefing on the Injunction Motion, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Stern v. Marshall . . . a ruling which created great uncertainty within the bankruptcy bench and 
bar.”); Michael Moody & Arthur Spector, Anna Nicole Smith Decision Affects Court’s Authority, 
DAILY BUS. REV., Aug. 23, 2011, at A8; John Pacenti, Justice Watch:  Anna Nicole Twist Put Into 
Rothstein Case, DAILY BUS. REV., Aug. 8, 2011, at A3 (quoting United States Bankruptcy Judge 
A. Jay Cristol that the Justices “don’t always understand fully what we are doing in bankruptcy . . 
. [Stern] is going to complicate a number of cases”); Stephen J. Lubben, Messing With the Bank-
ruptcy System, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2011, 2:58 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2011/08/26/messing-with-the-bankruptcy-system/. 
 19 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) (“If our decision today does not change all 
that much, then why the fuss?”). 
 20 See infra note 170. 
 21 See infra note 188. 
 22 See Coco, supra note 15, at 186-91. 
 23 See infra note 223. 
 24 See, e.g., Richard Lieb, The Supreme Court, in Stern v. Marshall, by Applying Article III 
of the Constitution Further Limited the Statutory Authority of Bankruptcy Courts to Issue Final 
Orders, 20 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 4, art. 1, 2 (2011) (“Although not directly addressed by the ma-
jority, it is unclear whether express consent by the parties is, by itself, a sufficient basis upon 
which a bankruptcy judge may adjudicate a common law claim.”). 
 25 See G. Marcus Cole & Todd J. Zywicki, Anna Nicole Smith Goes Shopping:  The New 
Forum-Shopping Problem in Bankruptcy, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 511, 515 (2010) (explaining that 
American bankruptcy laws constructed a hybrid system comprised of federal and state laws); 
Melodie Freeman-Burney, Jurisdiction Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984:  Summing 
Up the Factors, 22 TULSA L.J. 167, 179-83 (1986) (describing the bifurcated structure of the bank-
ruptcy system, where district courts retain judicial power of the United States and bankruptcy 
courts are units of the district court, thereby making bankruptcy judges judicial officers of the 
district court). 
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Under the current system, Congress has granted jurisdiction over 
bankruptcy to the district courts.26  The district courts may refer cases 
to bankruptcy courts, which function as units of the district courts.27  
Bankruptcy proceedings involve substantive entitlements and rules 
based on state laws.28  A bankruptcy judge must then decide whether 
the proceeding is a core or non-core proceeding.29  The practical effect 
of such a distinction is that a bankruptcy judge may enter final orders 
in core proceedings, but may only submit proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law in non-core proceedings.30  A lot of uncertainty 
revolves around the designation of core versus non-core proceedings.31  
This hybrid system and the vagaries of the Bankruptcy Code (“the 
Code”), therefore, give rise to efficiency concerns, forum shopping 
problems, constitutional questions, and other issues.   
Further, as one court stated, Stern may not be that big of a sur-
prise, since the Supreme Court “had already expressed its constitu-
tional concerns in Northern Pipeline.”32  Stern, therefore, only echoes 
the Supreme Court’s prior statement that the constitutional separa-
tion of powers must be revered.33  The decision only conjures up, and, 
to some extent, exacerbates the many unresolved problems plaguing 
the American bankruptcy system.34   
Finally, in Part III, this article proposes a solution to the 
longstanding issue of bankruptcy courts’ authority in the United 
States.  This section concludes that Congress should bestow the Bank-
ruptcy Court with Article III status.  Such a grant will cure further ju-
risdictional issues and also resolve many of the concerns being voiced 
in light of Stern – as well as those voiced decades before.35 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Paul P. Daley & George W. Shuster, Jr., Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & 
COM. L.J. 383, 387 (2005). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Cole & Zywicki, supra note 25. 
 29 Daley & Shuster, supra note 26, at 391. 
 30 Id.  
 31 Cole & Zywicki, supra note 25, at 519-20.  See, e.g., In re Teleservices Grp., Inc., 456 B.R. 
318, 323 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) (“My frustration with Stern is that it offers virtually no insight 
as to how to recalibrate the core/non-core dichotomy . . . .”). 
 32 In re Teleservices Grp., 456 B.R. at 322 (citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)). 
 33 Id. 
 34 See supra notes 18 and 25.   
 35 See infra notes 184-223. 
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II.  EVOLUTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT’S JURISDICTION 
A. In the Beginning 
The concept of providing relief for the economically burdened is 
as old as civilization itself.36  The first known law in recorded history 
that provided for the relief of debtors from their debts is found in the 
book of Deuteronomy, chapter 15.37  Prior to the enactment of Cessio 
Bonorum under Cesar, which abolished capital punishment, slavery 
and imprisonment for insolvent debtors, the Roman Law of the Twelve 
Tablets (451-450 B.C.) allowed creditors to carve up the bodies of their 
insolvent debtors and share the pieces proportionately.38  To the extent 
that Cessio Bonorum permitted financially distressed debtors, who 
had acted in good faith, to turn over remaining assets to their creditors 
and gain immunity from imprisonment or physical punishment, this 
body of law can be said to be a prototype of modern bankruptcy law.39   
During the Middle Ages, the Hanseatic League, the most success-
ful league of merchant associations, would banish debtors who could 
not meet their obligations.40  Another approach in some communities 
was to put the debtor to public shame by writing the debtor’s name in 
a crowded commercial district and ringing the ‘shame bell’.41  In Lom-
bardy, Italy, where traders and bankers conducted their business from 
benches or stalls in an open market, these traders would break the 
business bench of a debtor as a symbol of failure.42  
In England, bankruptcy laws were quasi-criminal in nature and 
were creatures of statute.43  Debt was considered immoral and fraudu-
lent: the first English Bankruptcy Act of 1542 referred to the debtor as 
                                                                                                                           
 36 David S. Kennedy & R. Spencer Clift, III, An Historical Analysis Of Insolvency Laws 
And Their Impact On The Role, Power, And Jurisdiction Of Today’s United States Bankruptcy 
Court And Its Judicial Officers, 9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 165, 166 (2000). 
 37 Id. (citing Deuteronomy 15:1-4 (“At the end of every seven years thou shalt make a 
release.  And this is the manner of the release: Every creditor that lendeth ought unto his neigh-
bor shall release it; he shall not exact it of his neighbor, or his brother; because it is called the 
Lord’s release.  Of a foreigner thou mayest exact it again; but that which is thine with thy brother 
thine hand shall release; save when there shall be no poor among you.”)). 
 38 Id. at 167. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 168.  
 41 Id. 
 42 Kennedy & Clift, supra note 36, at 168 (explaining that these Italian traders and bankers 
soon discovered the rich business opportunities in England and started to migrate there, bringing 
their customs with them, including the practice of breaking the bench).  The word ‘bankrupt’ is 
the Anglicized version of ‘broken bench.’  Id.   
 43 Id. at 168-69.   
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“the offender,” and an act in 1570 treated debtors as criminals.44  The 
statute of Queen Anne, passed in 1705, decriminalized bankruptcy law 
and allowed for the discharge of debts.45  This Statute was in effect at 
the time the forefathers suspended their relationship with England 
and established the United States of America.46  Though the Industrial 
Revolution brought more favorable perceptions of bankruptcy,47 the 
stigma attached to debt and debtors was transferred nonetheless to 
American society.48  
B. Development in American Jurisprudence 
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, bankruptcy proceedings were 
conducted by referees — later called bankruptcy judges — who were 
officers of the district court and appointed and removed by the dis-
tricts courts.49  The limited jurisdiction of the referees under the Act 
became a major obstacle to the efficient administration of bankruptcy 
cases.50  The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (“Reform Act”) was 
therefore enacted to address this concern; the purpose of the Reform 
Act was to expand the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts and provide a 
single forum for the adjudication of all issues related to the admin-
istration of a bankruptcy case.51    
The Reform Act granted United States bankruptcy judges “origi-
nal and exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and original, non-
exclusive jurisdiction over civil proceedings ‘arising under,’ ‘arising in,’ 
or ‘related to’ cases under the Bankruptcy Reform Act . . . .”52  The 
bankruptcy court was to be a separate entity from the district court.53  
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,54 the 
Court found this attempt to broaden the jurisdiction of bankruptcy 
courts unconstitutional on the basis that Congress cannot imbue Arti-
cle I courts with authority to make final rulings on common law claims 
                                                                                                                           
 44 An Acte Againste Suche Persones as Doo Make Bankrupte, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1542) 
(Eng.); An Acte Touchyng Orders for Banckruptes, 13 Eliz., c. 7 (1570) (Eng.); Kennedy & Clift, 
supra note 36, at 168-69.   
 45 Queen Anne’s Act, 4 Anne, c. 17 (1705) (Eng.); Kennedy & Clift, supra note 36, at 169-
70. 
 46 Kennedy & Clift, supra note 36, at 170. 
 47 Id.  
 48 See Coco, supra note 15, at 187-209. 
 49 Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1979); Daley & Shuster, 
supra note 26, at 384-85. 
 50 See Daley & Shuster, supra note 26, at 385.  
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 386. 
 53 Id. 
 54 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
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in the absence of Article III protections.55  To remedy the Reform 
Act’s jurisdictional problems, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy 
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.56  Under the Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984, following referral from the federal district 
court, a bankruptcy court must determine if the matter involves a core 
proceeding or a non-core proceeding.57  
In non-core proceedings, or those “related to” title 11 cases, the 
bankruptcy court may hear the matter and propose findings of facts 
and conclusions of law to the district court.58  An action is ‘related to’ 
bankruptcy if the “outcome might have a conceivable effect on the 
estate.”59  In core proceedings, which “arise in” a case under title 11 or 
“arise under” title 11, a bankruptcy judge may enter final judgment.60  
“A core proceeding is a proceeding that ‘invokes a substantive right 
provided by title 11’ or one that, ‘by its nature, could arise only in the 
context of a bankruptcy case.’”61  In other words, claims that have no 
existence outside of bankruptcy, or which would not exist but for 
bankruptcy, are said to “arise in” bankruptcy.62  Under 28 U.S.C. § 
157(b)(2)(C),63 “counterclaims by [a debtor’s] estate against persons 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Daley & Shuster, supra note 26, at 387. 
 56 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); see Daley & Shuster, 
supra note 26, at 387.  
 57 28 U.S.C. § 157(a)-(c) (2008) (found unconstitutional as applied by Stern v. Marshall, 131 
S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011)); see Susan Block-Lieb, The Case Against Supplemental Bankruptcy 
Jurisdiction:  A Constitutional, Statutory, And Policy Analysis, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 795-96 
(1994). 
 58 28 U.S.C. § 157(c) (2008); see Block-Lieb, supra note 57, at 796. 
 59 In re Extended Stay Inc., 418 B.R. 49, 55 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 60 28 U.S.C. 157(b) (2008); see Block-Lieb, supra note 57, at 796.  
 61 In re Fairchild Corp., 452 B.R. 525, 530 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).  There is much debate 
surrounding the distinction between core and non-core proceedings, and courts arrive at that 
demarcation using different rationales.  For example, in In re USDigital, the court adopted the 
Third Circuit’s two-step process to aid in its determination of whether a claim is a core proceed-
ing:  “First, a court must consult § 157(b) to determine if the claim at issue fits within that provi-
sion’s illustrative list of proceedings that may be considered core.  If so, a proceeding is core [1] if 
it invokes a substantive right provided by title 11 or [2] if it is a proceeding, that by its nature, 
could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case.  The two-part second element of the test 
must be met for a proceeding to be core, regardless of whether it is enumerated in section 
157(b)(2).”  In re USDigital, Inc., 461 B.R. 276, 284-85 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (alterations in origi-
nal) (footnotes and quotation marks omitted).   
 Expounding on the issue, the court further stated: “Why would the Third Circuit create an 
arguably superfluous element to its test?  This Court believes that the Third Circuit—like the 
Ninth—was seeking to establish a test covering both the statute and the Constitution.  Stern has 
divided the Court’s inquiry into two elements: statutory and constitutional.  But, given the over-
lap between the enumerated core proceedings and the second element of the Third Circuit’s test, 
this Court finds it to be an appropriate measure in determining whether a matter is a non-
enumerated core proceeding.”  Id. at 285 n.42.  
 62 See In re McClelland, 460 B.R. 397, 401 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 63 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (2008). 
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filing claims against the estate”64 are core proceedings, which means 
bankruptcy courts are granted statutory authority to enter final judg-
ment on such claims.65  This provision was the source of the conflict in 
Stern.66   
C. Recent Limitations on Bankruptcy Courts’ Jurisdiction 
In Stern, the Court found that 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C)67 violated 
Article III of the Constitution, and held that bankruptcy courts 
“lacked the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a 
state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a 
creditor’s proof of claim.”68  Vickie Lynn Marshall (a.k.a. Anna Nicole 
Smith) brought an action in a Texas probate court, prior to the death 
of her husband, Howard Marshall, against her stepson, E. Pierce Mar-
shall, alleging that Pierce fraudulently induced Howard to sign a living 
trust that did not include her.69  Pierce denied any such conduct on his 
part.70  
After Howard’s death, and while the probate case was pending, 
Vickie filed a petition for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the Central District of California.71  Pierce brought a defa-
mation suit against Vickie in the bankruptcy proceeding, to which 
Vickie asserted truth as a defense and raised a counterclaim for tor-
tious interference.72   
The bankruptcy court entered judgment in Vickie’s favor on the 
tortious interference counterclaim.73  On appeal, Pierce argued that 
the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over Vickie’s counterclaim.74  
The district court found that the bankruptcy court did have statutory 
authority, but concluded that, as a constitutional matter, the counter-
claim should not have been characterized as core.75  The district court, 
therefore, treated the bankruptcy court’s judgment as proposed rather 
than final, engaged in an independent review of the record, and even-
                                                                                                                           
 64 Id. 
 65 See Block-Lieb, supra note 57, at 796. 
 66 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2603-08 (2011).  
 67 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (2008). 
 68 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620. 
 69 Id. at 2601. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Cole & Zywicki, supra note 25, at 522-23.  Vickie’s filing of a petition for bankruptcy was 
in response to a default judgment of $884,607.98 that was entered against her in a sexual harass-
ment suit brought by her former housekeeper. 
 72 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601. 
 73 Id.  
 74 Id. at 2602. 
 75 Id. 
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tually ruled in Vickie’s favor.76  Interestingly, the district court chose to 
disregard the judgment of the Texas probate court, which had reached 
a final resolution and entered judgment in Pierce’s favor.77  The appel-
late court reversed the district court’s ruling, but on different 
grounds.78  
The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that 28 U.S.C. § 
157(b)(2)(C) allowed the bankruptcy court to enter final judgment on 
Vickie’s tortious interference counterclaim.79  Nevertheless, the Court 
found that such statutory grant of authority to bankruptcy courts was 
in contravention of Article III.80  Article III requires that the judicial 
powers of the United States vest “in one supreme Court, and in such 
inferior courts” established by Congress, and also provides salary and 
tenure protections.81  The bankruptcy judgeship was created under Ar-
ticle I and is not afforded any Article III protections – that is, tenure 
and salary guarantees.82  Article III protections, the Court reasoned, 
are elemental in the constitutional system of checks and balances, and 
both define and protect the independence of the judiciary.83  “[T]he 
Framers sought to ensure that each judicial decision would be ren-
dered, not with an eye toward currying favor with Congress or the 
executive, but rather with ‘[c]lear heads . . . and honest hearts’ deemed 
essential to good judges.”84 
Hence, Congress cannot assign to legislative courts any matter 
which “is the subject of a suit at common law, or in equity, or admiral-
ty” and brought “within the bounds of federal jurisdiction,” because 
responsibility for such matters rests with Article III judges.85  The only 
exception to this general rule regards cases in which the ‘public rights’ 
doctrine is applicable.86  The doctrine applies in cases where the claim 
being litigated is integrally related to a particular government action, 
and derives from a federal regulatory scheme.87  In Stern, Vickie’s 
counterclaim was simply a state tort action that was not “derived from 
or dependent on bankruptcy law.”88  The Court, therefore, concluded 
that Congress exceeded its authority, and held that the “Bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Id.  
 77 Id. 
 78 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 79 Id. at 2605. 
 80 Id. at 2608. 
 81 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 82 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 83 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2608. 
 84 Id. at 2609. 
 85 Id.  
 86 Id. at 2610. 
 87 Id. at 2613.  
 88 Id. at 2618. 
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Court below lacked the constitutional authority to enter a final judg-
ment on a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of 
ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim.”89  
The dissent disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that 28 
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) was unconstitutional.90  The dissent, penned by 
Justice Breyer, stated that the Court deviated from prior precedent – 
more specifically, from Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. 
Schor
91 and Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.92 – 
which allowed for a more pragmatic approach in determining the ad-
judicatory authority of a non-Article III judge.93  In Thomas, the Court 
emphasized that “practical attention to substance rather than doctri-
naire reliance on formal categories should inform application of Arti-
cle III.”94  Expounding on this principle, the Court in Schor, after con-
ceding that adjudication of the counterclaim by the administrative 
court might be of the kind traditionally decided by an Article III 
judge, concluded that ‘de minimis’ intrusion on the judicial branch was 
permissible to avoid practical negative consequences of a formalistic 
approach.95  In Schor, a customer filed reparations complaints with the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) against his com-
modity futures broker.96  The broker counterclaimed by seeking recov-
ery of debit balances on the customer’s account.97  Ultimately, the 
Court held that the CFTC could entertain the state law counterclaim 
in the reparation proceedings, without violating Article III.98  
Therefore, the dissent’s position in Stern was that the statutory 
grant of authority to a bankruptcy court, which allows it to adjudicate 
compulsory counterclaims, should be permissible in light of Schor and 
Thomas.99  The dissent further reasoned that, at most, the intrusion on 
Article III turf was de minimis, and hence, permissible.100  To substanti-
ate this point, the dissent argued that although the counterclaim in 
Stern resembled a kind normally decided by Article III courts, the mit-
igating factor was that bankruptcy courts often decide “claims that 
similarly resemble various common-law actions.”101  In addition, con-
                                                                                                                           
 89 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620. 
 90 Id. at 2622 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 91 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
 92 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985).  
 93 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2622 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Lieb, supra note 24, at 463.  
 94 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 587. 
 95 Schor, 478 U.S. at 853-56.  
 96 Id. at 837. 
 97 Id. at 837-38. 
 98 Id. at 841. 
 99 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2625-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 100 Id. at 2628-29. 
 101 Id. at 2626. 
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trary to the majority’s assertion, bankruptcy judges are not prone to 
improper influence by the other branches of government because 
bankruptcy judges are appointed by Article III judges, may be re-
moved by Article III judges, and have their salaries “pegged to those 
of the federal district judges.”102  
The dissent also pointed out that bankruptcy proceedings are su-
pervised and controlled by Article III courts, and parties are free to 
appeal to the district court.103  Furthermore, the parties in Stern con-
sented to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.104  Pierce could have 
brought his claim in a state or federal court, but chose to bring it in 
the bankruptcy proceeding.105  Moreover, the dissent highlighted the 
fact that Congress’s grant of authority over counterclaims to bank-
ruptcy courts was an important means of carrying out its Article 1, 
section 8 power106: these counterclaims often have more than “some 
bearing on a bankruptcy case,” and hence, 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) is 
important for an efficient and effective bankruptcy system.107  Finally, 
the dissent argued that contrary to the majority’s contention that the 
decision in Stern would not change much, as a practical matter, it will 
create an inefficient and costly bankruptcy system.108 
III. APPLICATION AND IMPACT OF STERN ON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND 
PRACTICE 
Bankruptcy judges, members of the bankruptcy bar, and the me-
dia have been in a frenzy since the decision was rendered in Stern.109  
The flurry is partly because the case “has a narrow holding, but poten-
tially enormous implications for bankruptcy courts and litigation in 
the federal courts.”110  There are those, however, who posit that Stern 
                                                                                                                           
 102 Id. at 2627. 
 103 Id.  
 104 Id. at 2627-28. 
 105 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2627-28. 
 106 Id. at 2628. 
 107 Id. at 2629. 
 108 Id. at 2630. 
 109 See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also Turturici v. Nat’l Mortg. Servicing, LP, 
No. CIV S-10-2853 KJM, 2011 WL 4480169, at *3 n.3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2011) (acknowledging 
the potentially enormous impact of Stern); In re Direct Response Media, Inc., 466 B.R. 626, 638 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (“There are two views as to the effect and holding of Stern . . . . In the face 
of confusion, the Court as have many others throughout the nation, will attempt to present a 
reasoned analysis of the issues before it, based on this Court’s interpretation of Stern.”).  The 
court in In re Direct Response further noted that: “The Court has found in excess of 130 cases in 
which bankruptcy courts have addressed Stern.  The analyses and decisions are not consistent.”  
In re Direct Response, 466 B.R. at 638 n.7. 
 110 Erwin Chemerinsky, Enormous Confusion, NAT’L. L.J., Aug. 29, 2011, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202512531253&slreturn=1.  Chemerinsky also 
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will not change anything about how bankruptcy law is practiced.111  But 
for others,112 “bombshell does fairly describe Stern’s impact upon the 
more practical issue of how bankruptcy judges are to perform what 
the Code still calls [them] to do.”113  Overall, many speculate that Stern 
will have an adverse effect on bankruptcy practice.114  Part A of this 
section briefly examines the major trends in the interpretation and 
application of Stern.  Part B explores the various consequences being 
promulgated by those at bar and by the media, and concludes that 
these problems are not novelties of Stern.  Rather, these are latent 
concerns in existence since the inception of modern bankruptcy courts 
and a by-product of the structure of the American bankruptcy system.  
A. Interpretation 
1. Dicta or Holding? 
Stern’s frenzied reception is fueled by disagreement on what the 
case ultimately means.115  The broad multifarious rationales in the deci-
sion116 leave many open-ended questions on the one hand, and, on the 
other hand, require pause for courts trying to make sense of it all.117  
An inventory of cases post-Stern, reveals that the decision has been 
subject to both a broad and a narrow interpretation118: the difference in 
interpretation basically boils down to how much weight a court de-
cides to give the dicta in Stern.119   
                                                                                                                           
noted that: “Stern v. Marshall made news only because it involved Anna Nicole Smith.  But few Su-
preme Court decisions will have a larger impact on the day-to-day work of judges and lawyers.”  Id. 
 111 See, e.g., Dan Schechter, Statutory Power of Bankruptcy Courts to Hear and Determine 
Compulsory State-Law Counterclaims Against Non-Bankrupt Claimants is Unconstitutional. 
[Stern v. Marshall, (U.S.).], 2011 COM. FIN. NEWSL. 51 (2011) (“I think the majority is right about 
at least one thing: in the long run, this is not going to be a game changer.”). 
 112 See supra note 18. 
 113 In re Teleservices Grp., Inc., 456 B.R. 318, 323 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011). 
 114 See supra note 18. 
 115 See, e.g., In re McClelland, 460 B.R. 397, 402 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The work is com-
pounded by the failure of the Supreme Court to definitively rule that the bankruptcy court is 
empowered by the “public rights” doctrine to make final adjudications regarding matters that 
are fundamentally concerned with the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations.”).   
 116 In re Wilderness Crossings, LLC, No. 09-14547, 2011 WL 5417098, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. Nov. 8, 2011). 
 117 See, e.g., supra note 115 and accompanying text; see also Kuney, supra note 6, at 1 (“The 
majority took pains to state that its decision was a narrow one . . . . This statement is belied by its 
reasoning, which is broad and applicable to each of the 16 subsections of 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2), 
which define the bankruptcy courts’ core jurisdiction.”). 
 118 See infra notes 120-34. 
 119 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).  
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An apparent majority of bankruptcy courts maintain that Stern is 
a very narrow holding  a point that Stern expressly made.120  Within 
this camp, and at its narrowest, Stern only applies to proceedings that 
mirror the unique circumstances of that case.121  This interpretation is 
supported by the Court’s emphasis on the point that its holding was 
“narrow” and applicable “in one isolated respect.”122  For further sup-
port, proponents of the idea that Stern’s holding was very limited posit 
that, since Justice Scalia’s concurrence agreed to the ultimate outcome 
of the case, but not the Chief Justice’s reasoning or underpinnings, 
“the decision is a 4-4-1 plurality that must be ‘narrowly’ interpreted.”123  
Other courts within this camp acknowledge the inconsistencies be-
tween the Court’s ‘narrow’ holding and its far reaching rationales.  
These courts include in their opinions a statement which provides that, 
if on appeal the district court finds that the bankruptcy court exceed-
ed it constitutional authority, the district court should treat the opin-
ion as a recommendation and not a final order.124 
By contrast, courts employing the broad interpretation of Stern 
look beyond its holding and rely heavily on the Court’s reasoning.125  
Parties to a case that assert this position will argue that “Stern strips 
bankruptcy courts of authority to enter a final judgment in any case 
where the debtor is bringing any action which seeks to augment the 
estate because they are legal actions that seek to take another’s prop-
                                                                                                                           
 120 See id. at 2620 (“[T]he question presented here is a ‘narrow’ one . . . . We conclude today 
that Congress, in one isolated respect, exceeded that limitation”); see, e.g., In re Safety Harbor 
Resort & Spa, 456 B.R. 703, 705 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011) (“The Debtor reads Stern too broadly.  
The Supreme Court’s holding in Stern was very narrow.  The Supreme Court merely held that 
Congress exceeded its authority under the Constitution in one isolated instance by granting 
bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to enter final judgments on counterclaims that are not necessarily 
resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim.”); In re Wilderness, 2011 WL 
5417098, at *2 (“Although the multifarious rationales in Stern are quite broad, the holding is 
mercifully narrow.”); In re Crescent Res., LLC, 457 B.R. 506, 510 n.2 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2011) 
(opining that Stern should be applied narrowly); In re McClelland, 460 B.R. at 401 (“In Stern v. 
Marshall, the Supreme Court held that one kind of “core” proceeding, that of counterclaims of 
the estate against parties filing proofs of claim, was unconstitutional in that it violated the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine.”); see also Kurz v. EMAK Worldwide, Inc., 464 B.R. 635, 645 n.6 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (finding that Stern’s holding is very limited).  
 121 See, e.g., In re Salander O’Reilly Galleries, 453 B.R. 106, 115 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(“Stern is replete with language emphasizing that the ruling should be limited to the unique 
circumstances of that case.”); see also In re Direct Response Media, Inc., 466 B.R. 626, 638 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2012). 
 122 See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620. 
 123 In re Direct Response, 466 B.R. at 644. 
 124 See In re Hudson, 455 B.R. 648, 656-57 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) (“Except for the types 
of counterclaims addressed in Stern v. Marshall, a bankruptcy judge remains empowered to enter 
final orders in all core proceedings . . . . If this court’s order is appealed, and the district court 
decides this court is not constitutionally authorized to issue a final order in this adversary pro-
ceeding, this opinion should be treated as a report and recommendation.”). 
 125 See, e.g., In re Blixseth, No. 09-60452-7, 2011 WL 3274042 (Bankr. D. Mont. Aug. 1, 2011). 
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erty and can only be finally adjudicated by an Article III judge.”126  A 
court’s decision to employ a broad interpretation is partly justified by 
the fact that, while dicta is not binding, the Court’s dicta carries great 
weight.127  In addition, judicial dicta – contrasted with obiter dicta – 
should not be ignored.128  These concepts are even more pertinent 
when applying Stern, because of the cardinal principles the Court ad-
dressed before getting to its ultimate conclusion.129  
For example, the Court stated that Congress may not encroach on 
the authority of Article III judges by delegating matters “made of ‘the 
stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by courts at West-
minster in 1789 . . . and . . . brought within the bounds of federal juris-
diction” to non-Article III courts.130  Further, the Court stated that the 
bankruptcy court exceeded its constitutional authority by “purporting 
to resolve and enter final judgment on a state common law claim . . . 
independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolv-
able by a ruling on the creditor’s proof of claim in bankruptcy.”131  The-
se broad assertions by the Court may effectively rebut the idea that 
Stern is applicable only in limited instances: these assertions encapsu-
late fundamental constitutional principles that need to be applied by 
all courts.   
Similarly, as Professor Kuney points out, although the Court stat-
ed that its holding is narrow, its reasoning seemingly applies to other 
sections of the Code dealing with claims which “would have been the 
sort heard by the courts at Westminster in 1789.”132  For instance, “non-
bankruptcy law counterclaims, especially mandatory counterclaims 
arising out of the same core of operative facts, in particular are impli-
                                                                                                                           
 126 In re Direct Response, 466 B.R. at 638. 
 127 See Robert G. Scofield, The Distinction Between Judicial Dicta And Obiter Dicta:  Unlike 
Obiter Dicta, Which Are Not Binding, Judicial Dicta Carry Great Authority, 25 L.A. LAW. 17 
(2002). 
 128 Id. at 17 (“Obiter dicta are ‘by the way’ statements.  Since courts usually do not give as 
serious consideration to the statements they make in passing as they do to the ratio decidendi, 
the statements do not constitute the binding part of a judicial precedent . . . . But judicial dicta 
are the product of a comprehensive discussion of legal issues and therefore should be granted 
greater weight than obiter dicta.  Judicial dicta should be followed unless they are erroneous or 
there are particularly strong reasons for not doing so.”). 
 129 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
 130 Id. at 2609. 
 131 Id. at 2611. 
 132 Kuney, supra note 6, at 9.  Professor Kuney explains that Stern could easily apply to 28 
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) (matters concerning the administration of the estate), § 157(b)(2)(F) 
(preference avoidance and recovery), § 157(b)(2)(H) (“proceedings to determine, avoid, or 
recover fraudulent conveyances” whether under incorporation of state law through 11 U.S.C. § 
544 or under § 548), and § 157(b)(2)(O) (“other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the 
assets of the estate”). 
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cated . . . .”133  Professor Kuney further states that if a bankruptcy court 
decides that a claim is the kind normally heard at Westminster in 1798 
then the court cannot enter final judgment, and it also lacks authority 
to issue a recommendation to the district court, as this is only availa-
ble for non-core matters, absent consent.134  
To date, the broadest interpretation given to Stern may very well 
be that of the court in In re Blixseth.135  The position in Blixseth has led 
other courts to expressly differ.136  After a thorough analysis of Stern, 
Blixseth’s conclusions were that: (1) “[u]nlike in non-core proceedings, 
a bankruptcy court has no statutory authority to render findings of 
fact and conclusions of law for core proceedings that it may not con-
stitutionally hear”;137 and (2) parties’ consent cannot authorize a bank-
ruptcy court to enter a final judgment where it would not be able to 
otherwise.138  By taking this position, the Blixseth court has gone be-
yond what Stern identified as its narrow holding, and has opted to ap-
ply the dicta instead.   
Whether courts subscribe to a narrow or broad interpretation, 
one common thread is the detailed, full-length analysis courts engage 
in to dissect Stern.  In this methodological approach, many courts con-
struct and apply tests.  For example, in In re Olde Prairie Block Owner, 
LLC,139 to determine jurisdiction, the court asked whether as an Arti-
cle I court it could enter final judgment on the debtor’s counterclaims 
as a core proceeding under § 157(b), provided the counterclaims rul-
ings were required to adjudicate the claim itself, or whether the claims 
were non-core but otherwise related and parties consented.140  The 
court also noted that Stern required that “each Counterclaim Count 
must be separately analyzed.”141  Further, the court stated that after 
Stern, bankruptcy judges’ authority with regards to ‘core’ claims have 
been limited.142  After an analysis of much of Stern’s dicta, the court 
                                                                                                                           
 133 Kuney, supra note 6, at 9. 
 134 Id.  at 9-10. 
 135 No. 09-60452-7, 2011 WL 3274042, at *12 (Bankr. D. Mont. Aug. 1, 2011). 
 136 See, e.g., In re Universal Mktg., Inc., 459 B.R. 573, 578 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011) (“Respect-
fully, I believe Blixseth is incorrect and I decline to follow it.”); In re Freeway Foods of Greens-
boro, Inc., 466 B.R. 750, 770 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012) (“Although the Blixseth court found that the 
consent of the parties cannot authorize a bankruptcy court to enter a final judgment on a cause 
of action . . . the overwhelming majority of courts have concluded that ‘the bankruptcy court has 
authority to render final judgments even in non-core proceedings with the consent of the par-
ties.’”).  
 137 In re Blixseth, 2011 WL 3274042, at *12.  
 138 Id.  
 139 457 B.R. 692 (Bankr. N.D. Ill .2011). 
 140 Id. at 696-97. 
 141 Id.  
 142 Id.  
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ultimately stated that the holding was narrow, but it was not limited to 
the counterclaim at issue in Stern; the court found the holding also 
applied to “others substantially like it.”143   
Similarly, in In re Freeway Foods of Greensboro, Inc.,144 after a 
careful examination of much of the Court’s dicta, the court concluded 
that Stern provided a two-prong test.145  After a review of Stern’s dis-
cussion on the lack of authority of bankruptcy courts to enter final 
orders in “non-bankruptcy matters that are based on the common law 
or state law,” the court stated that the Stern test asks: “whether the 
action stems from bankruptcy itself or would necessarily be resolved 
in the claims allowance process.”146  If either prong is answered in the 
affirmative, a bankruptcy court has authority to enter a final order.147  
If neither prong is satisfied, the bankruptcy court can only enter find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law.148    
2. Questioning Fraudulent Conveyance Actions 
Post-Stern, many courts have faced the question of whether a 
bankruptcy court can finally adjudicate a fraudulent conveyance ac-
tion.149  This question is a direct function of the Supreme Court’s broad 
reasoning in the decision, which potentially applies to other subsec-
tions of the Code.150  Among courts adopting the broad interpretation, 
one view is that the statutory grant of authority to adjudicate fraudu-
lent conveyances is constitutionally suspect in lieu of Stern and 
Granfinanciera, combined.151  This camp concludes that, while a bank-
ruptcy judge may issue a report and recommendation, after 
Granfinanciera and Stern, it is apparent that bankruptcy courts may 
not enter final judgment in fraudulent conveyance actions.152   
In support of this conclusion, statutory authority notwithstanding, 
Eric Brunstad, in an Amicus Brief, made a persuasive argument sup-
ported by the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Stern.153  Brunstad con-
                                                                                                                           
 143 Id. at 698. 
 144 466 B.R. 750 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012). 
 145 Id. at 768. 
 146 Id.  
 147 Id. 
 148 Id.  
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 See In re Refco Inc., 461 B.R. 181, 186 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating that “reasonable 
people may differ over whether Stern’s prohibition on the bankruptcy court’s issuance of a final 
judgment extends to fraudulent transfer claims”, and providing a laundry list of cases that take 
divergent positions on the issue). 
 150 See Kuney, supra notes 6 and 132. 
 151 In re Teleservices Grp. Inc., 456 B.R. 318, 338 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011). 
 152 See id. 
 153 Brief for G. Eric Brunstad as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 8, Exec. Bene-
fits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency), 665 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2011) [herein-
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cluded that bankruptcy courts may enter final judgment only where 
the parties have expressly consented because, as Stern stated, fraudu-
lent conveyance suits are “quintessential[] suits at common law,” and 
are more “accurately characterized as private rather than a public 
right.”154  In addition, “even with respect to matters that arguably fall 
within the scope of the ‘public rights’ doctrine, the presumption is in 
favor of Art. III courts.”155  And, where a proof of claim has been filed, 
a bankruptcy court can only adjudicate where the “action would nec-
essarily be resolved in the process of ruling on” that claim.156  Brunstad 
further reasoned that where a bankruptcy court improperly issues a 
final order on a fraudulent conveyance action, an Article III court 
may adequately cure the defect by treating the decision as a submis-
sion of “proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law” subject to 
de novo review.157  
To rebut this argument, narrow-interpretation courts point out 
that Stern did not address the question of whether bankruptcy courts 
can enter final orders in fraudulent conveyance actions, and it is, in 
fact, replete with language indicating that the case should be read nar-
rowly.158  Further, to extend Stern to fraudulent transfer actions, based 
on the Court’s dicta would “upend the division of labor between dis-
trict and bankruptcy courts that has been in effect for nearly thirty 
years.”159  Proponents of this view further argue that, even under the 
broad interpretation, bankruptcy courts may still finally adjudicate 
fraudulent transfers because these actions arise only in bankruptcy.  To 
support this position, and conclude that fraudulent transfer actions are 
core, the court in In re Custom Contractors160 engaged in the following 
analysis:  
[C]laims asserted by the Trustee are authorized by, and arise un-
der §§ 544(b) and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. Such claims “may 
                                                                                                                           
after Brunstad Br.]. Brunstad has argued several cases in front of the US Supreme Court, lec-
tures at Yale, and is a contributing author for the Collier treatise on bankruptcy law.  Brunstad’s 
profile can be found on his firm’s website. See G. Eric Brunstad Jr., DECHERT, LLP, 
http://www.dechert.com/eric_brunstad/ (last visited June 29, 2013).    
 154 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2614 (2011); Brunstad Br., supra note 153, at 9. 
 155 Brunstad Br., supra note 153, at 23 (citing Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2618).  
 156 Id. at 24 (citing Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620).  
 157 Id. at 14. 
 158 In re Custom Contractors, 462 B.R. 901, 906 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011). 
 159 Id. at 908; see also In re Heller Ehrman LLP, No. 08-32514DM, 2011 WL 4542512, *6 
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2011) (stating that “After Stern, some courts have concluded that they cannot 
hear fraudulent conveyance claims as core proceedings.  They are focusing on the dicta of Stern, 
not its holding.  I believe that this approach thrusts unnecessary burdens on already overworked 
district courts, especially when bankruptcy courts have a particular expertise in and familiarity 
with avoidance actions.”). 
 160 Custom Contractors, 462 B.R. at 901. 
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only be prosecuted by a bankruptcy trustee on behalf of a bank-
ruptcy estate, and because a trustee and a bankruptcy estate are 
strictly creatures of the Bankruptcy Code, there would be no le-
gal basis for this action were there no bankruptcy estate.” (cita-
tion omitted) These claims simply would not exist but for the 
bankruptcy. (citation omitted) The analysis does not change be-
cause § 544(b) authorizes a trustee to avoid a transfer that could 
be recovered under state law by an actual creditor of the debtor. 
(citation omitted) This action is not prosecuted by one of the 
debtor’s creditors to avoid a transfer under state law, but by a 
bankruptcy trustee as the official representative of the bankrupt-
cy estate to avoid prepetition transfers under the Bankruptcy 
Code. (citation omitted) Although § 544 incorporates state law to 
provide the “rules of decision,” the claim still arises under § 544 
which is a federal bankruptcy cause of action stemming from the 
bankruptcy itself. (citation omitted) In addition, “[a] determina-
tion that a proceeding is not a core proceedings shall not be 
made solely on the basis that its resolution may be affected by 
State law.” (citation omitted)161 
To substantiate the position that fraudulent transfers are core 
proceedings, one may reference Thomas162, where the Supreme Court 
recognized that, in rare cases, Congress “may create a seemingly ‘pri-
vate’ right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme 
as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited in-
volvement by the Article III judiciary.”163  On the flip side, however, 
this argument is weakened by the Court’s position in Granfinanciera 
and Stern, that fraudulent conveyance actions are “more accurately 
characterized as a private rather than a public right,”164 and they are 
“not closely intertwined with a federal regulatory program that Con-
gress has power to enact.”165 
In this sea of uncertainty, where courts are struggling to reconcile 
apparent inconsistencies in Stern, one thing seems sure – Stern has left 
the door open for a continuance of jurisdictional disputes.  Courts, like 
the one in Blixseth,166 seem to refuse to wait for the reprimand that is 
                                                                                                                           
 161 Id. at 907.  In its analysis, the Court cited to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3); In re Bujak, No. 10-
03569-JDP, 2011 WL 5326038, *2-3 (Bankr. D. Idaho Nov. 3, 2011); In re Heller Ehrman, 2011 WL 
4542512, at *5; and In re Universal Mktg., Inc., 2011 WL 5553280, *3 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 
2011). 
 162 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 594 (1985). 
 163 Id. 
 164 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2614 (2011).  
 165 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54-56 (1989).  
 166 See In re Blixseth, No. 09-60452-7, 2011 WL 5509484 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2011) (placing as 
much emphasis on Stern’s dicta as it does the holding). 
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almost sure to come years down the line, and give as much weight to 
Stern’s dicta as its holding.  Other courts, however, while cognizant of 
the fact that years from now the Supreme Court may use Stern as a 
platform to invalidate other portions of the Code, are grounded in 
knowing that “the job of bankruptcy courts is to apply the law as it is 
written and interpreted today.  Bankruptcy courts should not invali-
date a Congressional statute . . . or otherwise limit its authority to fi-
nally resolve other core proceedings—simply because dicta in Stern 
suggests the Supreme Court may do the same down the road.”167  
B. Impact and Consequences   
1. Inefficiency and Case Overload 
The dissent in Stern, penned by Justice Breyer, was first to high-
light that the decision, as a practical matter, has the potential to result 
in an inefficient bankruptcy process.168  It is very common for counter-
claims that resemble suits at common law and that involve the same 
factual disputes as core claims, to arise during bankruptcy proceed-
ings.169  As Justice Breyer warned, “[A] constitutionally required game 
of jurisdictional ping-pong between courts would lead to inefficiency, 
increased cost, delay, and needless additional suffering among those 
faced with bankruptcy.”170  There are particular efficiency and cost con-
cerns in the present socio-economic climate, where thousands of debt-
ors striving to save their homes from foreclosure will likely face mo-
tions seeking to move these cases to district court, which is a favorite 
forum for creditors.171  
                                                                                                                           
 167 See, e.g., In re Safety Harbor Resort & Spa, 456 B.R. 703, 718 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011) 
(explaining that although the Supreme Court may at a later date hold that section 157(b)(2)(F) 
dealing with fraudulent conveyances is unconstitutional, the job of courts are to apply the law as 
is).  The court also noted that the “Supreme Court does not ordinarily decide important ques-
tions of law by cursory dicta.”  Id.  (citing In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 
(1968)).  In agreement with the decision by the In re Safety court to not extend Stern’s limited 
holding, the judge in In re BankUnited Fin. Corp. stated: “Moreover, I am not going to be one of 
those bankruptcy judges who seizes on, and seeks to analyze, every line in the Stern opinion to 
determine what ripples may emerge from the self-described isolated pebble dropped in the 
jurisdictional waters.” 462 B.R. 885, 892 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011). 
 168 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2630 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Kuney, 
supra note 6, at 1 (“As a result, each assertion of core jurisdiction is now open for challenge and 
is subject to uncertainty. Without legislative action, this uncertainty will only be clarified through 
the lengthy process of litigation in each of the various federal circuits, a process that has already 
begun and that will continue for some time, at great expense.”). 
 169 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2626, 2630 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 170 Id. at 2630.  
 171 See Lieb, supra note 24, at 463-64; Patrick Scott, Supreme Court Addresses Limits On 
Bankruptcy Judges’ Powers, 33 NO. 21 WESTLAW J. ASBESTOS 12, 4 (2011).   
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It is already evident that Stern has become the mantra for strate-
gic and tactical litigants, who would rather litigate in a forum other 
than the bankruptcy court.172  A survey of cases post-Stern reveal that 
litigants are raising Stern for a plethora of issues, thereby extending 
the case beyond its intended effect.173  To highlight a few, Stern is being 
used to challenge the following: subject matter jurisdiction;174 bank-
ruptcy courts’ authority to hear claims based on state law;175 the bank-
ruptcy courts on the issue of consent;176 the bankruptcy court’s authori-
ty in Chapter 5 actions;177 and especially, the bankruptcy court’s au-
thority in fraudulent conveyance actions.178  Practicing in bankruptcy 
court may very well have become too focused on gamesmanship in-
stead of argument; for example, parties may choose to wait until the 
                                                                                                                           
 172 In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., 457 B.R. 299, 308 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 173 See infra notes 174-78. 
 174 See, e.g., In re Universal Mktg., Inc., 459 B.R. 573, 574-75 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011) (“The 
Defendant also asserts that the bankruptcy court lacks subject matter jurisdiction . . . .  Defend-
ant’s jurisdictional argument is based on the recent Supreme Court decision, Stern v. Marshall.”); 
see also New York v. Fairchild Corp. (In re Fairchild Corp.), 452 B.R. 525, 530 n.14 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2011) (“Stern v. Marshall is not a case about subject matter jurisdiction. Rather it addresses the 
power of the bankruptcy court to enter final orders, assuming that subject matter jurisdiction 
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2011) (quoting Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2607) (“Section 157 allocates the authority to enter final judg-
ment between the bankruptcy court and the district court. [] That allocation does not implicate 
questions of subject matter jurisdiction.”).  
 175 See, e.g., In re Soo Bin Kim, No. 10-54472-C, 2011 WL 2708985, *2 n.2 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
2011) (“Defendant has suggested that this court cannot hear any of this matter because it touch-
es on probate issues, and cites the Supreme Court recent decision in Stern v. Marshall . . . . The 
defendant overreads that case and its application to this proceeding.”); see also In re Salander 
O’Reilly Galleries, 453 B.R. 106, 118 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating that from Stern’s narrow 
holding it is clear that “the Bankruptcy Court is empowered to apply state law when doing so 
would finally resolve a claim”); In re Byce, No. 1:11-CV-00378-BLW, 2011 WL 6210938, *2-3 (D. 
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JustMed’s claim – including state-law issues that arise within that claim.  Stern did not hold that 
the bankruptcy court may not rule on state law issues when determining a proof of claim . . . . 
Again, it was not the mere presence of state law issues that drove the Stern decision . . . .”).    
 176 See, e.g., Mercury Cos., Inc. v. FNF Sec. Acquisition, Inc., 460 B.R. 778, 780 (D. Colo. 
2011) (“Defendants argue, inter alia, that one cannot consent to the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdic-
tion where the Bankruptcy Court does not have the authority to resolve claims before it.”).  
 177 See, e.g., In re Wilderness Crossings, LLC, No. 09-14547, 2011 WL 5417098, *1 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mich. 2011) (“With the benefit of case development and further reflection, however, this 
court is unwilling to automatically extend the dicta in Stern to default judgment motions under 
Chapter 5 . . . .”). 
 178 See, e.g., In re Custom Contractors, LLC, 462 B.R. 901, 904 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) (“The 
IRS argues that although it admitted in its Answer that this is a core proceeding, the intervening 
decision in Stern v. Marshall limits the Court’s authority to enter a final order in this fraudulent 
transfer action.”); In re Bujak, No. 10-03569-JDP, 2011 WL 5326038, *1 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011) 
(“Relying upon an extension of the Supreme Court’s holding in Stern v. Marshall . . . , the County 
argues that this Bankruptcy Court lacks constitutional power to enter a final judgment on Trus-
tee’s fraudulent conveyance claims, and as a result, the claims are dismissed.”). 
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eve of trial before raising objections.179  Debtors in this context “are 
not likely to have the financial resources to oppose such proceedings 
that financial institutions can afford to pursue.”180  Additional risks of 
delay, uncertainty and increased costs are exacerbated by the fact that 
a party may raise lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any stage of the 
case; doing so could result in upsetting a final order in a case based on 
a last-minute jurisdictional plea.181 
On the other hand, arguably, Stern really changes nothing as 
bankruptcy courts will continue to hear all non-core claims involved in 
proceedings, submit findings as proposals – as opposed to final orders 
– and district courts will simply imprint their stamp of approval.  Addi-
tionally, parties have always had the opportunity to appeal to the dis-
trict court from final orders entered by bankruptcy judges.182  In this 
business-as-usual atmosphere, parties will come out with “two pieces 
of paper from two different courts, and a useless extra helping of delay 
and expense.”183  
Further, at most, Stern has exacerbated certain defects in the 
bankruptcy process, but it sure did not create them, as the significant 
delay and expense involved in bankruptcy proceedings are attributa-
ble to the American hybrid, two-tiered bankruptcy system.184  Where 
bankruptcy is infused with state substantive law,185 and claims akin to 
those at common law are commonplace during the process,186 the cur-
rent statutory structure – jurisdiction to district courts and bankruptcy 
courts authority dependent on core versus non-core distinction187 – is a 
breeding ground for uncertainty, delay and litigation over jurisdiction.   
This system is the cradle for the endless back-and-forth between the 
Supreme Court and Congress on the authority of bankruptcy judges. 
2. Forum Shopping 
In addition to efficiency concerns, another proposition is that “the 
principal significance of the Stern decision is that it will encourage a 
permissible type of forum-shopping” – especially in favor of creditor-
defendants, who “most often prefer the fact finder to be a district 
judge.”188  In other words, “creditors facing state law claims by a bank-
                                                                                                                           
 179 See, e.g., In re Peacock, 455 B.R. 810, 812-14 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011). 
 180 Lieb, supra note 24, at 464. 
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 182 See Block-Lieb, supra note 57, at 796.  
 183 Schechter, supra note 111, at 51.   
 184 See Daley & Shuster, supra note 26.  
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 186 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2630 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 187 See Block-Lieb, supra note 57.  
 188 Scott, supra note 171, at 4. 
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ruptcy estate may choose between the bankruptcy judge and a district 
court as the fact finder in the case.”189  As the impact of Stern starts to 
manifest, the issue of forum-shopping has become evident: litigants 
are seeking to forum-shop by tactfully making very creative argu-
ments, very late in the case, based on Stern.190  For example, in one case 
the plaintiff tried to get out of bankruptcy court by arguing lack of 
consent, when the case was well under way; the court retorted that 
plaintiff’s actions was nothing but a “variation of forum shopping.”191   
Forum-shopping is not a unique product of Stern.  Rather, it has 
been a problem since the inception of bankruptcy courts.192  Forum 
shopping has been “problematic with amendments to the Act 
throughout the twentieth century,”193 partly fueled by the vagueness of 
28 U.S.C.  § 157, which embodies bankruptcy’s jurisdictional struc-
ture.194  The indefinite wording of the statute left much up to the dis-
cretion of bankruptcy courts in determining what is a ‘core’ proceed-
ing.195  Hence, pre-dating Stern, “forum-shopping problem[s] [arose] 
when core jurisdiction [was] viewed expansively, so as to effectively 
place bankruptcy judges on an equal footing with state courts and Ar-
ticle III federal courts”196 in disputes that were independent of the fed-
eral bankruptcy statutory scheme.197  Stern has curbed this problem to 
the extent that parties no longer have an option in bankruptcy courts 
for proceedings that are “not resolved in the process of ruling on a 
creditor’s proof of claim” or based in federal bankruptcy law.198 
In addition, the American hybrid bankruptcy system – a federal 
system ingrained with substantive entitlements and rules based on 
state laws199– creates the challenge and almost erases any chance of 
parties choosing their forum in a non-opportunistic way.  The antidote 
to having the resolution of a dispute contingent on the forum in which 
the dispute is adjudicated was to make the bankruptcy court a place 
                                                                                                                           
 189 Id. at 1.  
 190 See supra notes 174-78; In re Bayonne Med. Ctr., No. 07-15195, 2011 WL 5900960, *6 
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 191 See In re Bayonne Med. Ctr., 2011 WL 5900960, at *6.  
 192 See Cole, supra note 25, at 517. 
 193 Id. 
 194 See id. at 521.  
 195 See id. 
 196 Id. at 520. 
 197 See id.  
 198 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011). 
 199 See Cole, supra note 25, at 515. 
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with special procedures and no special substantive law.200  Over the 
years, however, litigants have been able to use the bankruptcy system 
to gain better results than they would in a state system, thanks to the 
vagueness of the statutory scheme.201  Vickie was initially able, for ex-
ample, to take her case to the bankruptcy court and win on state law 
counterclaims, where the state probate court had ruled in Pierce’s fa-
vor.202  The problem of forum shopping, therefore, existed way before 
Stern.  Furthermore, creditors still had some ability to choose between 
a bankruptcy judge and a district court judge prior to Stern in cases 
where a jury trial was required and where the creditor had not filed a 
proof of claim.203    
3. Prolongation of the Tension Between Article III Judges and 
Bankruptcy Judges 
The Court’s decision in Stern expresses a lack of confidence in 
the ability of bankruptcy judges to rule with “clear heads” and “honest 
hearts” in the absence of Article III protections that make the judici-
ary immune to any inappropriate coercion from other branches of 
government.204  One concern, however, is that the true undercurrent of 
the decision is Article III courts’ lack of confidence in the bankruptcy 
courts.205  This concern is not unfounded; as discussed above, there has 
been a stigma, almost disdain, attached to debtors and insolvency 
since the Roman Empire, which transfused into American society.206  
And it is no secret that Article III judges have not been immune to 
prevailing stereotypes of the bankruptcy system.207  
The Judicial Conference, made up of Article III judges208, was 
strongly opposed to Congress’ intent to grant Article III status to 
bankruptcy courts, pursuant to recommendations by the House Judi-
ciary Committee during the drafting of the Bankruptcy Code of 
                                                                                                                           
 200 See id. at 512.  
 201 See id. at 521. 
 202 See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006). 
 203 Scott, supra note 171, at 1.  
 204 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609 (2011). 
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HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 199 Cal. App. 4th 118, 123 n.2 (2011) (“Plaintiff cited only one bank-
ruptcy court decision in support of her argument that section 2932.5 applies to deeds of trust.  
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A federal bankruptcy court decision interpreting California law, however, is not due the same 
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 206 See supra notes 43-48. 
 207 See Coco, supra note 15. 
 208 See id. 
582 FIU Law Review [8:559 
1978.209  Former District Judge, Simon Rifkind, and former Circuit 
Judge, Attorney General Griffin Bell, opposed granting Article III 
status to bankruptcy judges because “it ‘would dilute the significance, 
and prestige, of district judgeships’” and “diminish the . . . influence of 
our district courts.”210  Chief Justice Warren Burger shared the same 
sentiment, and went as far as to make a personal supplication to the 
President to exercise the presidential veto.211  The Chief Justice went 
under fire for breaching separation of power delineations,212 but he 
probably thought it worth it in the end, as ultimately bankruptcy 
courts were not granted Article III status.213  
Explanation for this bizarre behavior on the part of members of 
the Judicial Conference may be attributed to a “sort of an ego trip” or 
jealousy of power.214  Another perspective is that the stigma attached 
to bankruptcy has relegated the practice to a subordinate position in 
the legal hierarchy.215  This position posits that, traditionally, within the 
legal hierarchy bankruptcy has been an inferior field of legal practice, 
in which bankruptcy attorneys were viewed to be of inferior caliber.216  
In addition, debt and financial failure has always been taboo in socie-
ties – past and present.217  Initially, bankruptcy was practiced by a mar-
ginalized group of lawyers, and more successful firms had no interest 
in engaging in the practice.218  There was also a lack of uniform rules, 
which made it an insider’s practice, and the appearance of the impar-
tiality became a major problem.219  A mixture of these reasons led to 
bankruptcy occupying a subordinated position in the legal system.220  
As Professor Linda Coco has stated, this “bias is unsupported by 
contemporary bankruptcy court judicial ability, expertise, and work 
ethic, yet this perception, because it is accepted, operates to demoral-
                                                                                                                           
 209 See id.; see also Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The 
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ize what is arguably one of the most vital and essential judicial forums 
in the United States today.”221  Whatever justifications existed in the 
past for the inferior view of the bankruptcy practice are moot today in 
light of the level of professionalism in the bankruptcy bar – and espe-
cially in light of the caliber of bankruptcy judges and their invaluable 
contributions to American society.222 
4. Separation of Powers Issues and Consent 
Another criticism of Stern is that it implicates separation of pow-
er issues.223  It seems to be, however, a repeat of the back-and-forth 
between the Court and Congress in defining the limits of bankruptcy 
courts as happened in 1978 and 1982.224  Now that § 157(b)(2)(C) – 
which allows bankruptcy courts to hear counterclaims brought against 
the estate – has been stricken, Congress may have to make some 
changes, since the intent of the Act was to give bankruptcy courts 
broad powers;225 as early as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Con-
gress indicated that its intent was to expand the jurisdiction of bank-
ruptcy courts and provide a single forum to adjudicate all issues relat-
ing to the administration of a bankruptcy case.226 
In Stern, the Court also left mixed signals as to the role of consent 
in bankruptcy proceedings.227  28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) allows bankruptcy 
courts to enter final orders in ‘non-core’ proceedings, where the par-
ties have consented.228  After all the emphasis placed on the im-
portance of Article III safeguards and the preservation of separation 
of powers, it seems unlikely, however, that the Court would find it ap-
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propriate for parties to bypass all these safeguards simply by consent-
ing to jurisdiction.229  For example, in Vickie’s instance, “Pierce repeat-
edly consented to the bankruptcy court’s adjudication of his defama-
tion claim against the estate.”230  Nevertheless, the Court concluded 
that Pierce did not “truly consent,”231 which leaves the question of 
whether consent is still a determinative factor, and, if so, what quality 
of consent is required?   
On the question of the quality of consent required, one view is 
that simply filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy proceedings may be 
insufficient since, unlike the party in Schor, he could have pursued his 
claim in federal court, “[p]arallel reasoning is unavailable in the con-
text of bankruptcy proceedings, because creditors lack an alternative 
forum to the bankruptcy court in which to pursue their claims.”232  Fur-
ther, Stern seems to be a departure from the Court’s position in 
Lagenkamp,233 that “even when private rights are at issues, non-Article 
III adjudication may be appropriate when both parties consent.”234  
The dissent pointed out that there is no relevant distinction between 
claims filed in Stern with those in Lagenkamp235 and Granfinanciera236, 
and hence, Pierce’s filing of a proof of claim, in the light of precedent, 
was ‘true’ consent to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.237  
Another perspective is that the commonsensical conclusion is 
that Stern has left the role of consent intact, seeing that district judges 
can allow parties before them to agree to final resolution of their is-
sues by binding arbitration.238  To interpret Stern any differently could 
potentially create a case overload in district courts as not only would 
the bankruptcy court not be able to enter judgment when parties con-
sent – a process that significantly lightens the workload of district 
courts – but also the ability of other Article I courts and magistrates to 
do so would be called into question.239  And though post-Stern cases 
evidence some hesitation about the role of consent, courts seem to be 
in agreement that parties may still consent to the bankruptcy courts’ 
final adjudication of claims.240  Stern “recognized the value of waiver 
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and forfeiture rules”241, and there is really no reason for the Supreme 
Court to have held otherwise.242  In terms of the quality of consent re-
quired, courts on this side of the fence maintain that consent can be 
implied; courts are willing to do so to prevent parties from sandbag-
ging the court, a practice even Stern disapproved of.243  Further, one 
court, post-Stern, has stated that authority exists to support the con-
clusion that “even a mistaken admission of core jurisdiction acts as 
consent.”244  
With the majority’s strict prohibitions on Congress even slightly 
encroaching on Article III turf,245 Congress may have to change con-
sent-based jurisdiction.  In the meantime, there is sure to be a great 
amount of litigation surrounding the role of consent and the validity 
of section 157(c)(2).  Failure to modify the consent provision makes it 
even more likely that there will be further back-and-forth between 
Congress and the judiciary on the question of bankruptcy court au-
thority; “the issue that just won’t go away.”246    
IV. SOLUTION TO JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES 
As became evident in less than a year after Stern, a great deal of 
resources – especially time and money – will be expended by parties 
and by the courts, in an effort to interpret and enforce Stern.247  With-
out appropriate legislative action, every few years this game of ping-
pong will continue.  The questioning of the bankruptcy court’s authori-
ty has been occurring since the inception of bankruptcy courts.248  Just 
as it took the Supreme Court over twenty years after Northern Pipe-
line
249 to rule that Congress’ attempt to define bankruptcy jurisdiction 
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in light of that case was invalid, Stern is an omen of future challenges 
to the current bankruptcy system.  A piecemeal fix by Congress will 
not suffice.  To rectify this waste of time and resources, and to prohibit 
future violation of important constitutional principles, Congress 
should bestow Article III status on bankruptcy courts, as it thought of 
doing in 1978.250  This is not a novel proposition, but it is one that has 
become fundamental after Stern.251   
Why should courts with “reputations for fast-paced, efficient, re-
sult-oriented adjudication”252 not have Article III status?  Why should 
the court that handled 1.6 million cases in 2010, compared to the fed-
eral courts’ 280,000 civil and 78,000 criminal cases, not be worthy of 
Article III status?253  Why should the court that steered parties through 
the tumultuous economic climate, replete with Ponzi schemes, of the 
last few years, not also enjoy Article III protections?254  The time is 
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particularly appropriate in light of the many holes courts are poking 
through the Code as they attempt, after in depth analysis of Stern and 
prior precedent, to navigate constitutional boundaries.255  “The known 
certainty of the law is the safety of all,”256 but bankruptcy practice 
seems to be anything but certain at this point.  As this Article has 
shown, so many questions abound regarding the inconsistencies left by 
Stern, and litigants’ results depend on whether they end up in a court 
that is reading Stern narrowly or broadly.  Agreeably, there is no “easy 
solution”257, but litigants and constitutional principles cannot afford 
“what I suspect will be years of uncertainty as the bankruptcy process 
grinds on.”258 
Even for those who find refuge in the fact that bankruptcy courts 
can continue to hear claims and submit a report and recommendation 
to the district court which then enter an order – more like rubber 
stamp – the endless debate of which claims are core and which are 
non-core remains.259  With courts coming out differently on this issue, 
this hodgepodge proposition provides no real solution.  Further, under 
this approach, bankruptcy judges become nothing but the glorified 
assistants of district courts,260 a result that runs contrary to Congress’ 
intent and one that yields little or no benefit to anyone – even district 
judges.261  For this same reason, any bankruptcy system that in effect 
                                                                                                                           
similarly took center stage in debates about restructuring another swath of the national econo-
my—the domestic automobile industry—as Chrysler and General Motors filed for reorganiza-
tion under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
 255 See supra notes 115-61; see, e.g., In re Teleservices Grp. Inc., 456 B.R. 318 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. 2011) (the court in approximately 30 pages discusses and analyzes Stern, its implications 
and prior precedent); In re Freeway Foods of Greensboro, No. 10-11282, 2012 WL 112192, *10 
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012) (“On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall. Since 
then, many litigants and courts have struggled to understand the Stern’s reasoning and apply its 
holding.”). 
 256 U.S. v. Leech, 601 F. Supp. 956, 959 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (reciting the oft-quoted saying of 
Lord Coke).  
 257 In re Teleservices Grp., 456 B.R. at 344. 
 258 Id. 
 259 See Norton and Lieb, supra note 251, at 85 (explaining that of the two Congressional 
options, one is to revert to the referee system.  This system is impractical for present bankruptcy 
practice); Cole, supra note 25, at 519 (stating that the “distinction between core and non-core 
matters is crucial, albeit elusive”). 
 260 In re Teleservices Grp., 456 B.R. at 327 (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2627 
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) stating that: “This, then, is why the lack of guidance in Stern is so 
disappointing.  Chipping away at Authority Section 157(b)(2) subpart by subpart is a disservice 
to both the district courts and the bankruptcy courts if, in the end, the outcome is for the bank-
ruptcy courts to have no independent authority at all . . . . However, unless some rationale is 
found to justify a different outcome, Stern’s sweeping statements concerning Article III’s reach 
portend a new world where my colleagues and I will in fact become only the functional equiva-
lents of “magistrate judges, law clerks and the Judiciary’s administrative officials.”). 
 261 See id. at 324 (“One alternative would be to play it safe and simply refer without reflec-
tion every future determination I make to a district judge for his or her final review.  However, I 
 
588 FIU Law Review [8:559 
reverts to the “pre-1973 system does not offer practical choice.”262  
Such a system could not effectively address the mountainous work-
load of today’s bankruptcy system.263  And district courts have “little or 
no present capacity to take on trial or administrative responsibility for 
bankruptcy cases.”264  The only result of such a system would be to 
wastefully duplicate the efforts of the bankruptcy and district courts.265 
Another suggestion may be that there is no need for Article III 
status since parties can still consent, and, thereby allow bankruptcy 
judges to adjudicate their claims.  Waiver would be great but for the 
fact that after Stern there is a real question, as has been discussed in 
this article, about the role of consent.  On the one hand, the Supreme 
Court suggested that Pierce did consent, and that it would be inequi-
table to have him sandbag the court.266  On the other hand, however, 
the Court stated that Pierce did not “truly consent”267; this begs the 
question as to what constitutes sufficient waiver.  Further, it seems 
unlikely that the Supreme Court would be so adamant about protect-
ing constitutional boundaries, where it concludes that Congress has 
encroached on the Judiciary, and give litigants the opportunity to dis-
regard the system of checks and balances that Article III has in 
place.268   
This point is substantiated by the Supreme Court’s discussion in 
Schor:269  The Court, while acknowledging that a litigant may waive the 
right to having an action heard in an Article III court, stated that this 
is not an absolute principle.270  Where Article III safeguards of the role 
of the Judiciary are implicated by “the encroachment or aggrandize-
ment of one branch at the expense of the other . . . parties cannot by 
consent cure the constitutional difficulty for the same reason that the 
parties by consent cannot confer on federal courts subject-matter ju-
risdiction beyond the limitations imposed by Article III . . . .”271  Con-
                                                                                                                           
do not see how I can do so in good faith given Authority Section 157(b)(3)’s direction that I must 
decide even in instances when not requested whether I have the ability or not under that section 
to enter a final order.  Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3).  Moreover, I suspect that the Article III judges in 
my district would not be pleased with the extra workload such an approach would impose upon 
them.”). 
 262 Norton and Lieb, supra note 251, at 85.  
 263 Id. at 85-86. 
 264 Id. at 85. 
 265 Id. 
 266 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608 (2011). 
 267 Id. at 2614. 
 268 See id. 
 269 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 847-51 (1986). 
 270 Id. at 848-51. 
 271 Id. at 850-51. 
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sent, in this scenario, is not dispositive and a number of factors must 
be taken in account.272   
Another indication that consent may not be the “cure all,” is the 
Supreme Court’s shift in Stern, from the practical approach taken in 
Schor, to a greater reliance on substantive principles underlying con-
stitutional delineations among the branches.273  As the dissenting opin-
ion in Stern highlighted, Schor274 and Thomas275 allowed for a more 
pragmatic approach in determining the adjudicatory authority of a 
non-Article III judge;276 that is, de minimis intrusion on Judicial Branch 
was permissible to avoid practical negative consequences of a formal-
istic approach.277  That being said, consent still plays an important role 
not only in bankruptcy courts but also in other Article I settings; for 
example, where parties consent, a Magistrate can enter final judgment 
after hearing a civil case.278  After Stern, however, and in light of prior 
precedent,279 it is apparent that consent will not be the cure all for 
some of the issues that continue to plague bankruptcy courts.  Estab-
lishing Article III bankruptcy courts will be the most effective course 
of action going forward. 
If this is such a rational choice, why has it not taken effect?  The 
answer seems to lie in the politics and egos involved in the undercur-
rent.  In fact, these were prominent issues that surfaced and dominat-
ed as part of the debate on bankruptcy reform in the 1970s.280  As not-
ed earlier on, Article III judges, many of whom served on the Judicial 
Conference, were very vocal about their fear that their prestige would 
be diluted if bankruptcy judges were accorded Article III status.281  But 
as this article has noted, whatever bankruptcy practice may have been 
decades ago that led to this stigma, today such ideological concerns 
should be nonexistent as bankruptcy judges are deemed to be some of 
the most brilliant, professional, and capable judges.282  
                                                                                                                           
 272 Id. at 851. 
 273 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011) 
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 275 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985).  
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 282 See McKenzie, supra note 222, at 755 (“Moreover, the status and quality of the bank-
ruptcy bar in general, and the bankruptcy courts in particular, have risen in tandem in the last 
thirty years as bankruptcy has regained its place of prominence in law practice.”).  See also Coco, 
supra note 15, at 225 (“This bias is unsupported by contemporary bankruptcy court judicial 
ability, expertise, and work ethic . . . .”). 
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As far as Congress is concerned, establishing specialized Article 
III courts is not a novel concept, and it has been successfully accom-
plished in the past.283  The bifurcated nature of American bankruptcy 
practice makes it the perfect candidate for the Article I-to-III transi-
tion.  As Professor McKenzie explained, the current structure of the 
bankruptcy courts does not fit the conventional justification for non-
Article III tribunals.284  First, appellate review may not be a sufficient 
check on bankruptcy courts, as only a relatively small percentage of 
decisions get appealed.285  Second, matters handled by the bankruptcy 
courts are not narrow and technical.286  Rather, bankruptcy courts han-
dle a broad spectrum of issues; that is, bankruptcy is a specialized pro-
cess, but it has no specialized substance as bankruptcy judges address 
“matters sounding in contract, tort, property, labor, and almost every 
other area of civil law.”
 287  Bankruptcy cases “routinely implicate non-
bankruptcy-specific rules of decision,”288 which further implicate eco-
nomic and social policy.289  Because of this, bankruptcy judges are not 
as insulated from political interest, as some may think.290  
V.  CONCLUSION  
Stern has done a great job of reminding us of the many problems 
that underline the American hybrid, bifurcated bankruptcy system.  
Unfortunately, the decision muddied the waters a lot more on issues 
such as the role of consent.  At the end of the day, however, it feels 
more like déjà vu – that is, it takes us back roughly 20 years to the 
shuffle between the Supreme Court and Congress regarding the Re-
form Act and Northern Pipeline.  This jurisdictional game, tainted by 
politics and a great amount of ego, will continue until Congress makes 
the most logical and productive move to bestow bankruptcy courts 
with Article III status.  The need for certainty in bankruptcy practice 
and cardinal constitutional principles, demand an end to this jurisdic-
tional ping-pong.  But until Congress fixes it, and fixes it well, this 
game continues.  
                                                                                                                           
 283 See Roger M. Whelan, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction: Hard-Core Problem, 1995 ANN. 
SURV. BANKR. L. 17, 515 (1995) (stating that the development and history of the Court of Claims, 
the Customs Court and the Court of Customs & Patent Appeals – all specialized courts be-
stowed with Article III status – “presents a sound precedent for the bankruptcy court’s Article 
III status”).   
 284 McKenzie, supra note 222. 
 285 Id. at 777. 
 286 Id. at 772-76. 
 287 Id. at 747, 751. 
 288 Id. at 773. 
 289 Id. at 774-76. 
 290 Id. 
